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12.1 Introduction
Singapore’s experience with international capital ﬂows over the past two
decades or so has been a rather—although not completely—benign one,
owing to strong fundamentals and generally well-conceived macroeco-
nomic policies. At the same time, useful lessons can be learned regarding
issues such as exchange rate policy, the policy of noninternationalization of
the Singapore dollar, and unavoidable fallout eﬀects of capital ﬂow volatil-
ity even in generally sound environments and how these may best be dealt
with.
A feature of Singapore’s economy that sets it apart from various other
countries discussed in this volume is its well-developed banking system and
equities market, and the fact that it is on a (modiﬁed) currency board (CB)
system. Its bond market is, however, less developed, although in recent
years measures have been taken to foster its growth, as discussed below. It
may be useful, therefore, to begin by comparing Singapore’s experience
with that of another state with a well-developed ﬁnancial system, namely
Hong Kong: the latter, in addition, operates what may be termed a “pure”
CB system. Notwithstanding their economic similarities, Singapore and
Hong Kong have had rather diﬀerent experiences with capital ﬂows, and
an examination of why this has been so turns out to be rather instructive.
In section 12.2, therefore, we brieﬂy examine Hong Kong’s experience dur-
ing the Asian crisis of 1997–98 and identify its areas of vulnerability. In sec-
tion 12.3, we discuss Singapore’s policy background and how it responded
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ther lessons are drawn in section 12.4, in which we consider Singapore’s ex-
perience during the Asian crisis. Section 12.5 discusses Singapore’s debt
markets, an interesting feature being that both Singapore and Hong Kong
have in recent years encouraged foreign enterprises to ﬂoat bond issues in
Singapore dollars (S$) and Hong Kong dollars (HK$), respectively. Sec-
tion 12.6 concludes. An appendix provides a chronology of the evolution
of capital controls (speciﬁcally, the evolution of the noninternationaliza-
tion policy) in Singapore.
12.2 Hong Kong: The 1997–98 Experience
As indicated above, our discussion here will be fairly brief, given that our
main focus is on Singapore, and is designed primarily to provide a com-
parative perspective on Singapore’s experience.1A minimalist deﬁnition of
a pure CB system is that it is one in which domestic currency is issued or re-
deemed (a) only in exchange for foreign currency and (b) at a ﬁxed ex-
change rate, usually vis-à-vis a single foreign currency, termed the reserve
currency. A modiﬁed CB system, discussed further below, is then one in
which criterion (a) holds, but not (b). A pure system aptly describes the
Hong Kong situation, with the exchange rate ﬁxed at HK$7.8 to the U.S.
dollar (US$) since October 1983. Moreover, the monetary base in Hong
Kong was rather small, given that it does not impose reserve requirements
on banks and has an eﬃcient, real-time interbank payment system so that
“the aggregate balance that banks maintain in their clearing accounts held
with the currency board” (Yam 1998a) is low. This rendered Hong Kong
vulnerable to speculative capital outﬂows, of which there were a number in
mid-1997 through mid-1998: these did not succeed, in part because the re-
sulting high interest rates adversely aﬀected the speculators too, who had
borrowed Hong Kong dollars in the interbank market to launch their at-
tacks. The high interest rates (the overnight interest rate actually rose to
280 percent on October 23, 1997) and their adverse eﬀects on the stock
market and economic activity in general were, however, a source of con-
cern.2
The really major attack, however, occurred in August 1998, and Yam
(1998a) describes the so-called double play thus:
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1. Here we draw mainly on Rzepkowski (2000), Yam (1998a, 1998b), and Corsetti, Pesenti,
and Roubini (2001).
2. The attacks reﬂected contagion from crises elsewhere in the region (Rzepkowski 2000;
Hashimoto and Ito 2004) and uncertainties associated with Hong Kong’s accession to China.
While Yam (1998a) refers to the interest rate increases as an “autopilot mechanism”—an in-
evitable concomitant of the CB system—Rzepkowski contends (2000, p. 15) that they were
partly induced, on occasion, by discretionary increases in the Hong Kong Monetary Au-
thority’s (HKMA’s) discount rate.In August [after an announcement that ﬁrst-quarter gross domestic
product growth had been negative] the speculators adopted a more so-
phisticated ploy. They introduced a form of double play aimed at play-
ing oﬀ the currency board system against the stock and futures markets.
First, to avoid being squeezed by high interest rates, they prefunded
themselves in Hong Kong dollars in the debt market, swapping US dol-
lars for Hong Kong dollars with multilateral institutions that have raised
Hong Kong dollars through the issue of debt. At the same time, they ac-
cumulated large short positions in the stock index futures market. They
then sought to engineer extreme conditions in the money market by
dumping huge amounts of Hong Kong dollars. This sell-oﬀ was in-
tended to cause [either a devaluation or] a sharp interest rate hike, which
in turn would have sent the stock market plummeting. The collapse of
the stock market would have enabled them to reap a handsome proﬁt
from the futures contracts they had taken out.
Presumably, a double play facilitates a stronger currency attack, since
the higher interest cost resulting from an attack of a given size is at least
partly oﬀset by the possible gains from short selling in the stock index fu-
tures market. Rzepkowski (2000) points out that speculators also engaged
in short selling of stocks, and that “the hedge funds involved in the specu-
lation were identiﬁed as being the Quantum Fund of George Soros, the
Tiger Fund, the Moore Global Investment, and the Long Term Capital
Management” (p. 17). Their prefunding activities had driven the Hong
Kong interest rate premium over the U.S. dollar to about 5 percentage
points (Yam 1998b). It was estimated (Yam 1998a) that “the hedge funds
involved had amassed in excess of HK$30 billion in currency borrowings,
at an interest cost of around HK$4 million a day. They also held an esti-
mated 80,000 short contracts, which translated into the following calcula-
tion: for every fall of 1,000 points in the Hang Seng index they stood to
make a proﬁt of HK$4 billion.” Owing to the marking-to-market of their
margin accounts with the Futures Exchange, they stood to gain daily from
incremental falls in the Hang Seng Index (Rzepkowski 2000, pp. 17–18).
In the event, the attack proved unsuccessful. Like Singapore, Hong
Kong has very substantial nonmonetary foreign reserves—reserves in ex-
cess of what is required to back the monetary base. At the time, it was un-
expectedly confronted with a ﬁscal deﬁcit, and had to convert part of these
reserves into Hong Kong dollars to meet its ﬁscal obligations. “The imme-
diate impact of this sale [of foreign currency], of an amount exceeding the
HK$30 billion accumulated by the hedge funds, was the non-trigger of
high interest rate” (Rzepkowski 2000, p. 19). In addition, and quite un-
conventionally,
between the 14th and 28th August 1998, the HKMA intervened via the
Exchange Fund on the stock and futures markets. It acquired a portfolio
of equities and HSI [Hang Seng Index] futures for an amount of about
Capital Flows and Exchange Rate Volatility 577US$15 billion, that is 7% of the capitalization and around 30% of the cur-
rent [1998] Hang Seng Index value....   About 13% of its nonmonetary
reserves . . . were allocated to these interventions, inducing an important
injection of liquidity into the money market. (Rzepkowski 2000, p. 19)
By November, the portfolio had risen to US$19 billion in value, and dur-
ing the interim speculators “were forced to close out their short positions,
in many cases with heavy losses” (Yam 1998a). The portfolio was subse-
quently placed under the management of a separate company at arm’s
length from the HKMA, with the aim of divesting it gradually.
After August 1998, systemic improvements were introduced, with the in-
tention of minimizing the occurrence of future attacks. The Exchange
Fund, which manages Hong Kong’s monetary and nonmonetary reserves,
had since 1990 issued bills to promote the development of the local bond
market, and in September 1998 virtually unrestricted discounting of
Exchange Fund bills by commercial banks at the discount window of
the HKMA, at nonpenal rates, was introduced. Eﬀectively, this almost
doubled the size of the monetary base, and it served to signiﬁcantly reduce
the interest rate response to a capital outﬂow of a given magnitude (Rzep-
kowski 2000, pp. 18–20). In addition, the government
brought in a 30-Point package tightening the regulation of the securities
and future markets. Measures in the package include the strict enforce-
ment of the T 2 settlement process, imposing a super margin on brokers
with highly concentrated positions, introducing the client identity rule,
increasing the penalty for naked short selling, creating a new oﬀence for
unreported short sales, and introducing new requirements for stock
lenders to keep proper records of their lending activities. In parallel,
SEHK [the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong] re-introduced the up-tick
rule (no short selling below the current best ask price) for covered short
selling and HKFE [the Hong Kong Futures Exchange] tightened the
large open position reporting requirements and imposed position limits
for HSI 33 Futures and Option Contracts. (Dickens 2002, p. 3).3
Subsequently, “relaxation measures applicable to certain market neutral
transactions [were] introduced” (Dickens 2002, p. 3).
While the Hong Kong authorities have taken the view that the hedge
funds were engaged in predatory market manipulation, Corsetti, Pesenti,
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3. Prior to launching their attack in August, the hedge funds had borrowed Hong Kong
stocks, to a large extent in the more eﬃcient oﬀshore market, from international fund man-
agers and custodians (Rzepkowski 2000, n. 20). In addition, owing to “lax settlement re-
quirements” (Yam 1998b, quoted in Rzepkowski 2000, n. 22), naked short selling was also
practiced, even though it was against the law. Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (2001, p. 43) also
quote a study by the Financial Stability Forum (2000): “Aggressive trading practices by HLIs
[highly leveraged institutions] reportedly included concentrated selling intended to move
market prices, large sales in illiquid oﬀshore trading hours, and spooﬁng of the electronic bro-
kering services to give the impression that the exchange rate had moved beyond the HKMA’s
intervention level. There were frequent market rumours, often in oﬀshore Friday trading, that
a devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar or Chinese renminbi would occur over the weekend.”and Roubini (2001) adopt a more agnostic position, stating that “the hy-
pothesis of rational investors taking short positions in two markets (based
on an assessment of economic fundamentals) and the hypothesis of a
double play (suggesting market manipulation) are observationally equiva-
lent” (p. 44). One could hypothesize, alternatively, that the weakening fun-
damentals, due to both domestic and regional developments, had pushed
the economy into a zone in which multiple equilibria (discussed further be-
low) existed. Speculators then endeavored to drive the economy to the un-
favorable equilibrium (possibly hoping that their actions would serve as a
signal to others), seeking to reap large proﬁts in the process, and were not
averse to resorting to questionable means (such as naked short selling) to
do so. One would then interpret the HKMA’s actions as seeking to main-
tain the economy at the favorable equilibrium—successfully, as it turned
out. In this framework, the equilibria themselves—in particular the equi-
librium level of stock prices—depend inter alia on the extent of policy in-
tervention by the authorities.4
The foregoing account permits (preliminary) identiﬁcation of areas of
vulnerability to speculative attack, or fault lines, in the Hong Kong en-
vironment of 1997–98. The ﬁrst is the commitment to a ﬁxed exchange
rate. The Hong Kong authorities probably felt that they had no alternative
in the matter, since any devaluation so soon after the accession to China
could, it was felt, trigger a massive loss of conﬁdence—a multiple-
equilibria scenario analogous to Diamond-Dybvig-style bank panics, but
aﬀecting asset (including stock) prices in Hong Kong’s case.5(Instead, real
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4. In their theoretical discussion, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (2001) recognize that large
players can inﬂuence market outcomes, but the authors appear reluctant to hypothesize that
this occurred in Hong Kong’s case. Their formal analyses deal with speculative attacks in a
single market, and they then informally extrapolate their results to the Hong Kong case. How-
ever, in a double-play situation, if a devaluation does not occur, speculators can either lose or
gain (Corsetti and his coauthors simply assume that they will lose), depending on the actions
of other speculators and of the authorities, which aﬀect interest rates and present and future
stock prices. It is also entirely conceivable that in the Hong Kong case speculators failed to
fully anticipate the extent and nature of the authorities’ reaction. Rzepkowski (2000, p. 28)
adopts a view of the underlying process somewhat similar to ours, arguing that “the logic
underlying the several attacks against the HK dollar rests essentially on self-fulﬁlling expec-
tations and on a pure contagion.” Next, Chakravorti and Lall (2000) formally model a spec-
ulative double play and conclude that “government intervention in the equity market may ei-
ther reduce interest rate or reduce the downward price pressure in equity markets but not
both” (p. 23), owing to countervailing actions by speculators. They very peculiarly assume,
however, that such intervention has no monetary eﬀects, contrary to Rzepkowski’s observa-
tion earlier, and they also overlook the fact that in Hong Kong, as indicated above, a fairly
large sum of nonmonetary reserves was converted into Hong Kong dollars to meet ﬁscal ob-
ligations. A useful policy lesson here is that, if intervention is to be undertaken in response to
a double play, it should also be targeted at both equities and money markets.
5. This is a possibility that Devereux (2003) does not address in his comparison of the im-
plications of the diﬀering exchange rate regimes of Hong Kong and Singapore for longer-run
trends in inﬂation and real exchange rates, and for short-run macroeconomic and real ex-
change rate volatility. It is also not clear whether his short-run simulation analysis imposes ex-
pectational rationality with regard to changes in the exchange rate (equal, in his model, to the
expected rate of inﬂation of traded-goods prices) and the price of land.gross domestic product [GDP] grew by 3 percent in 1999 and 10.2 percent
in 2000.) In more normal situations, however, an adjustable peg (a) pro-
vides, as is well known, speculators with a one-way bet (especially if the
band around the peg is fairly narrow), and (b) does not permit gradual ex-
change rate adjustments in the light of slowly changing fundamentals. The
second vulnerable area is the ease with which speculators could borrow
Hong Kong dollars, either in the interbank market or from multilateral in-
stitutions. The third is the unrestricted ease of short selling, in stock spot
and index futures markets, and the laxity in enforcement of settlement re-
quirements. Last is the initial small size of the monetary base, coupled with
reliance on the autopilot mechanism of the CB system.6 We turn now to a
discussion of some of Singapore’s experiences with capital ﬂow volatility,
and we should also recognize that not infrequently a tension exists between
the desire for short-run stability and the desire to foster deeper and more
open ﬁnancial and capital markets for purposes of long-run growth and
development of the economy.
12.3 Singapore: Policy Background and Early Experience
Any discussion of Singapore’s experience must assign a prominent place
to a major, long-standing (but recently relaxed, as discussed below) cor-
nerstone of its monetary policy: the policy of noninternationalization of
the Singapore dollar.7 In Notice 621 of November 1, 1983, the Monetary
Authority of Singapore (MAS) stated:
Banks should observe the Authority’s policy of discouraging the inter-
nationalization of the Singapore dollar. Speciﬁcally, banks should con-
sult with the Authority before considering Singapore dollar credit facil-
ities exceeding S$5 million (per entity) to nonresidents, or to residents
where the Singapore dollars are to be used outside Singapore. Banks
managing syndicated loans, bond issues, or other ﬁnancial papers ex-
ceeding S$5 million should do likewise. The terms “residents” or “non-
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6. In his empirical work, Rzepkowski utilizes the information in currency option prices to
infer the expected intensity of a Hong Kong dollar devaluation, and then, in a vector autore-
gression framework, demonstrates the existence of a speculative double play: “A circular
scheme characterized the formation of self-fulﬁlling expectations. The [expected] intensity of
a HK dollar devaluation induced a sharp decrease in the index futures prices, which con-
tributed to make the volatility of the HSI soar, in turn exacerbating the speculative pressures
against the HK dollar” (p. 27). However, he then argues that the HKMA’s stock market in-
terventions in August 1998 were ineﬀective, since they “achieved to push up temporarily the
index futures price, but induced a signiﬁcant rise in the market volatility.” Instead, it was the
technical measures introduced in September 1998 to strengthen the CB system (see p. 578, this
volume) that, he claims, dampened the pressures against the currency. Rzepkowski acknowl-
edges that his options analysis abstracts from the possibility of a time-varying risk premium
and imposes “strong assumptions on the underlying dynamics” (p. 29), and so the robustness
of his ﬁndings remains an open issue.
7. We draw here mainly on Chan and Ngiam (1996, 1998), but we critique their formal anal-
ysis below; we draw as well on Lee (2001).residents” include bank and nonbank customers (quoted in Chan and
Ngiam 1996, p. 5).8
Chan and Ngiam (1996, p. 6) point out that “To ensure that its regula-
tions are not being circumvented through ﬁnancial derivatives, the MAS
has deﬁned Singapore dollar credit facilities to cover a wide range of ﬁ-
nancial instruments, including loans, foreign exchange swaps, currency
swaps, interest rate swaps, facilities incorporating options, and forward
rate agreements in Singapore dollars.”9 Subsequently, on July 18, 1992, the
MAS issued a circular amending the policy. Consultation with the MAS
was not required for credit facilities extended in Singapore dollars, in any
amount, to residents or nonresidents to facilitate direct exports from and
imports to Singapore, and for payment bonds in favor of Singapore parties,
or payment guarantees, in respect of “economic activities” in Singapore,
where the latter speciﬁcally excluded ﬁnancial and portfolio investments.
Forward sales of Singapore dollars earned from exports to Singapore were
also permitted.
At the same time, banks were told that they should not ﬁnance in Singa-
pore dollars “activities which have no bearing on Singapore” (Chan and
Ngiam 1996, p. 5), including direct or portfolio investments outside Sin-
gapore by nonresidents, third-country trade by nonresident-controlled
companies, and nonresident subscription to equity in a Singapore com-
pany where the proceeds are used for takeovers or ﬁnancial investments.
Moreover, note Chan and Ngiam (1996), banks were “advised against
granting Singapore-dollar credit facilities to nonresidents for speculating
in the local ﬁnancial and property markets.” For all other activities—
which are quite wide ranging, and include third-country trade as well as di-
rect and portfolio investments overseas by residents, and direct investment
and housing development in Singapore by nonresidents—the 1983 ruling
calling for consultation with the MAS continued to apply.
It perhaps bears noting that there are no restrictions against nonresi-
dents’ building up Singapore dollar holdings by converting their own for-
eign currency resources (or resources borrowed abroad) into Singapore
dollars and placing them with the domestic banking units (DBUs). More-
over, by 1994 “the ACUs and the banks outside Singapore [had] amassed
some S$51.6 billion worth of Singapore-dollar deposits (or 25 percent of
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8. Singapore also has a very active oﬀshore Asian currency market (in non-Singapore cur-
rencies), and banks are required to maintain separate accounts for Asian currency units
(ACUs; Chan and Ngiam 1996, p. 4). “Nonresidents include Singapore-incorporated com-
panies, which are majority-owned or otherwise controlled by nonresidents” (Lee 2001, p. 34).
9. Chan and Ngiam (1996) state, “Without any restrictions, a ﬁrm or individual can bor-
row Singapore dollars indirectly by ﬁrst borrowing U.S. dollars and then doing a foreign ex-
change swap (which involves the buying of the Singapore dollar spot with the simultaneous
selling of the Singapore dollar forward). This eﬀectively replicates, or synthesizes, a Singa-
pore dollar money market loan with a ‘lock-in’ Singapore dollar interest rate” (p. 6).total liabilities) in the DBUs” (Chan and Ngiam 1996, p. 7). Such holdings
could be converted into foreign currencies if sentiment regarding the Sin-
gapore dollar turned adverse; however, any further pressure through non-
residents’ borrowing domestic currency and converting it, as occurred in
Hong Kong, was obviated.10 “Further pressure” here refers not to any in-
creased likelihood of the country’s reserves being unable to support capi-
tal outﬂows—which obviously cannot occur under a CB system—but to
heightened short-term interest rates and their eﬀects on the economy, as
well as the enhanced complexity of monetary management.
Commencing in August 1998, a series of steps was undertaken to grad-
ually liberalize the noninternationalization policy, in conjunction with
moves to promote the development of the Singapore dollar bond market.
These are discussed in greater detail in section 12.5. Throughout, however,
the MAS made it clear that “banks shall not extend S$ credit facilities [ex-
ceeding S$5 million] to non-resident ﬁnancial institutions if there is reason
to believe that the S$ proceeds may be used for S$ currency speculation”
(MAS Notice 757 of May 28, 2004). In the “frequently asked questions”
document accompanying this notice, it was stated that banks were “ex-
pected to institute appropriate internal controls and processes to comply
with this restriction”; these could include “written conﬁrmation from the
non-resident ﬁnancial institution specifying the purpose of funding” and
a “formal evaluation process of the client proﬁle, which provides a clear ba-
sis for assessing that the client is unlikely to use the S$ proceeds for cur-
rency speculation.” Banks were also required to report to MAS monthly
their aggregate outstanding Singapore dollar lending to nonresident ﬁ-
nancial institutions. Clearly, there is an element of judgment involved in as-
sessing that a client is unlikely to engage in speculation, but to date this
does not appear to have created diﬃculties for banks.
The noninternationalization policy thus rather eﬀectively blocked one
of the channels of vulnerability that existed in Hong Kong. What about
another channel, that of short selling of shares?11 This, too, was circum-
scribed in Singapore: Poitras (2002, p. 147) points out that “sales for same
day delivery” are permitted, and in its Report on Transparency of Short
Selling the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Se-
curities Commissions (IOSCO; 2003, p. 10) states that the Stock Exchange
582 Basant K. Kapur
10. Chan and Ngiam (1996, p. 8) also suggest that “as the forward market involving the Sin-
gapore dollar is rather thin, it cannot provide an eﬀective vehicle for speculation”; moreover,
the MAS monitors forward transactions with a view to ensuring that these are used for hedg-
ing and not for speculation. Chan and Ngiam further suggest that borrowing by residents for
speculative purposes does “not seem to be a major concern as the Government can bring
them to task if they bring down the Singapore dollar” (n. 27); the point being made here prob-
ably relates to the greater ease of monitoring, and if necessary regulating, the activities of res-
idents, and perhaps also the greater sophistication and speed of action of foreign hedge funds
and the like.
11. As discussed below, stock index futures were only introduced in 1998.of Singapore (SES) “may suspend individual securities if speculative activ-
ity is excessive or abuse is suspected.”12 We thus observe a role being as-
signed to discretion in decision making, and both this and the same-day
covering rule are in all likelihood reﬂective of the literature’s ambiguity re-
garding the net beneﬁt of short selling, especially in the presence of large
players.
Discussion of the other two channels of vulnerability—the ﬁxity of the
exchange rate and the narrowness of the monetary base—is best carried
out in the context of Singapore’s exchange rate experience in the 1980s. As
Teh (1988) points out,
The Singapore dollar exchange rate is managed and set against a trade-
weighted basket of currencies of its major trading partners. The trade-
weighted Singapore dollar is allowed to ﬂoat within a target band. The
MAS keeps the trade-weighted dollar within the band through foreign
exchange interventions [in U.S. dollars]....  T h e  l e v e l  a t  w hich the trade-
weighted dollar is set is determined by what world inﬂation and domes-
tic inﬂation are expected to be. Generally, the aim is to reduce imported
inﬂation in domestic prices by appreciating the trade-weighted dollar.13
Departures from the foregoing general objective have occurred under re-
cessionary conditions, during which the Singapore dollar has been per-
mitted to depreciate to a certain extent. The ﬁrst post-1965 recession in
Singapore occurred in 1985, when real GDP fell by 1.6 percent, followed
by slow growth of 2.3 percent in 1986 (Peebles and Wilson 2002). In re-
sponse, as ﬁgure 12.1shows, the dollar depreciated gradually from 1985 to
the beginning of 1987. The depreciation was not an entirely smooth aﬀair,
however, as we now discuss.
It appears that speculators overestimated the extent to which the au-
thorities were prepared to permit the exchange rate to depreciate. By Au-
gust 1985, the currency had depreciated to about S$2.20:US$1 (from about
S$2.10:US$1 earlier), and it then came under speculative pressure, primar-
ily through spot conversions of Singapore dollars into foreign currencies
(Chan and Ngiam 1996, pp. 7–8). By Thursday, September 12, it had fallen
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12. There appears to be some confusion of interpretation about the issue. Bris, Goetzmann,
and Zhu (2003, p. 33) say that in Singapore short selling is “not allowed” but is “practiced,”
while Morgan Stanley (2003) says, “There are no by-laws under the SGX [Singapore Ex-
change Ltd.] that forbid short-selling[;] however the present CDP [Central Depository] sys-
tem actively works against it. This is because short sellers must cover their positions within
the same day or face a buy-in by the SGX” (p. 4). Poitras (2002) says that “Except in very re-
strictive circumstances, short selling of stock on the SES is prohibited,” while the technical
committee of IOSCO (2003) states that short selling is “unrestricted,” except for the caveat
mentioned above. Market practitioners conﬁrm, however, that short sellers are expected to
cover their positions by the end of the same day, after which a buy-in by the SGX can occur;
as mentioned, suspension of individual securities can also be instituted.
13. As the MAS (2000b) points out, under a pure CB system the rate used by the CB deter-
mines the market exchange rate, whereas in Singapore the exchange rates used by the CB “de-
pend on the current rates in the foreign exchange market” (p. 24).to almost S$2.31:US$1 (Starr 1985). The following Monday, the MAS in-
tervened, by spending US$100 million (amounting to less than 0.1 percent
of its foreign reserves, according to Chan and Ngiam) to purchase Singa-
pore dollars. The consequence was an immediate rise in the overnight in-
terbank rate, which reached 120 percent on September 18, and the cur-
rency strengthened to S$2.20:US$1—an appreciation of about 5 percent in
just four days. A news source noted that “substantial losses have almost
certainly been incurred by foreign banks as a result of speculating against
the Singapore dollar” (Textline 1985). Thereafter, liquidity was gradually
restored to the money market, but it was also made clear that the MAS
would not hesitate to act again if necessary.
Clearly, in addition to the noninternationalization policy and the dis-
couragement of speculative short selling of shares, the exchange rate pol-
icy played a signiﬁcant role in defusing the speculative attack. Initially per-
mitting the exchange rate to depreciate to S$2.20:US$1, in line with
weakening fundamentals, took some of the edge oﬀ speculative pressure.
It would appear that the authorities then permitted, for some time, a fur-
ther depreciation owing to uncertainty regarding the path of fundamen-
tals. When it was determined that this depreciation was excessive, they
were in a position to inﬂict substantial losses on speculators. As in the case
of Hong Kong, Singapore’s very healthy reserve position was a valuable as-
set in this regard. Unlike the case of Hong Kong, however, nonadherence
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Fig. 12.1 Singapore’s exchange rates
Source: MAS (2001), kindly updated by the MAS.
Note: REER uses export competitiveness weights and is deﬂated by relative unit labor costs.to a ﬁxed peg implied that speculators faced a “two-way bet”: this may
have constrained the intensity of the attack then, and, by strengthening the
MAS’s reputation for toughness, reduced speculators’ willingness to at-
tack in the future as well. Finally, the ﬂexibility with which the MAS gen-
erally permits short-term uncollateralized borrowing by banks, in support
of its exchange rate policy (MAS, n.d., p. 6), meant that the speculative
pressure prior to the MAS intervention did not appreciably raise short-
term interest rates (Textline 1985). We proceed next to examine lessons
learned during the Asian crisis of 1997–98.14
12.4 Singapore: The 1997 Experience
We begin with a succinct statement by Chan and Ngiam (1998, p. 259):
During the recent Asian currency crisis, which began when Thailand al-
lowed its baht to ﬂoat on July 2, 1997, the Singapore dollar, along with
all the regional currencies, showed a signiﬁcant fall against the US dol-
lar for six months. From a high of $1.43 per US dollar on the day before
the ﬂoat of the baht, the Singapore dollar went all the way down to
S$1.75 per US dollar on January 7, 1998, a decline of 18.3 percent over
the period....   Although the Singapore dollar depreciated against the
US dollar, it appreciated sharply against the regional currencies. Hence,
on a trade-weighted basis, the Singapore dollar actually showed a slight
appreciation since July 1, 1997. The Singapore dollar has withstood the
currency storm lashing the region because of its extremely strong eco-
nomic fundamentals . . . [including] low foreign debt, huge foreign ex-
change reserves, large current account surpluses, substantial budget sur-
pluses, high savings rates, strong inﬂow of foreign direct investment, a
sound ﬁnancial system and prudent government policies.
We thus observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between Singapore’s exchange
rate experience in 1997 and its experience in 1985. The greater depreciation
in 1997, compared to the initial depreciation of only about 5 percent from
S$2.10 to S$2.20 per U.S. dollar in 1985, might have reﬂected a judgment
that the economic situation was more serious in 1997; at the same time, a
larger depreciation might have been more in line with speculators’ priors,
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14. Chan and Ngiam’s (1998) formal analysis of the 1985 episode appears, however, to be
ﬂawed. They erroneously assume that the exchange rate appreciated from a preexisting dis-
equilibrium level but that interest rates nonetheless fell because, by underscoring the authori-
ties’ determination not to allow the currency to weaken, the appreciation reduced the per-
ceived probability of a devaluation. In fact, however, interest rates did (as indicated above) rise
after the appreciation, owing to the liquidity squeeze, and only fell subsequently. The key el-
ement of losses imposed on speculators by the appreciation is not included in the Chan and
Ngiam analysis; nor do they recognize that the appreciation was intended to bring the ex-
change rate to an (equilibrium?) level that was lower than the original S$2.10 level. Indeed, it
is diﬃcult to imagine the perceived devaluation probability, and the interest rate, falling for
good if the exchange rate did indeed remain overvalued.and the latter might also still have had memories of the 1985 experience.15
In both years, the noninternationalization policy and the short-sale re-
strictions would also have helped. Singapore’s experience also exempliﬁes
the point made in section 12.2 regarding the merits of gradual rather than
discrete adjustments in situations that are not too extreme.
Notwithstanding the fairly smooth exchange rate adjustment, Singa-
pore was not spared from volatility in other asset markets, particularly eq-
uities and property. From a high of 2055.44 in January 1997, the Straits
Times index of stock prices dropped by 60 percent to 856.43 in September
1998 before recovering (Ngiam 2000, p. 6 and ﬁg. 2). The private property
price index dropped monotonically by about 40 percent from 270.0 in the
ﬁrst quarter of 1997 to 163.7 in the fourth quarter of 1998 (Ngiam 2000,
p. 6 and ﬁg. 3). Real GDP in fact declined by 0.9 percent in 1998 (table
12.1). It would not be correct to ascribe these developments solely to con-
tagion eﬀects, and trade and banking exposure to the region. Other factors,
such as the global electronics slowdown, the downturn in the domestic real
estate cycle, and (over time) the gradually increasing competition from
China and India, also played a signiﬁcant part. However, Singapore’s ex-
perience in 1997–98 underscores the fact that countries that plug into the
global economic grid will tend to experience not only higher mean growth
rates but also greater variability of those growth rates. As has often been
noted, capital can ﬂow out of a country as well as into it. Selective mea-
sures aimed at particular sectors can mitigate the degree of volatility, but
are unlikely to be capable of eﬀectively eliminating it. Of course, economic
agents will in due course learn to make improved risk-return calculations,
and at the same time governments would be well advised to develop vari-
ous coping mechanisms, such as a reasonable degree of social insurance
and provision of skill upgrading and retraining facilities to help those who
are severely aﬀected by shorter-term cyclical changes as well as longer-
term structural ones.
12.5 Debt Markets in Singapore
We begin with some ﬁgures for the 1990s. Table 12.2, from Ong (1998),
provides information on the debt-asset ratio (DAR) of nonﬁnancial corpo-
rations in Singapore, Canada, and the United States. The ratio in Singapore
declined somewhat in the 1990s, being fairly modest at 0.31, of which 0.21
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15. Hashimoto (2003, p. 256) obtains “puzzling” results in seeking to identify speculative
pressure against the Singapore dollar in 1997, including the fact that a large depreciation oc-
curred when her estimated depreciation likelihood was lowest. Methodologically, her as-
sumption that speculators condition only on the M2–foreign exchange reserves ratio in de-
ciding when to launch an attack appears rather restrictive, and it is also not clear what her
estimated critical level of 0.25 for this ratio for Singapore signiﬁes, since the actual ratio was




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.was due to short-term debt (deﬁned by Ong 1998, p. 9, as “the sum of bank
loans and overdrafts, short-term commercial papers and other short-term
loans”), and 0.10 to long-term debt (“the sum of preference shares, bonds
and debentures, and other long-term loans,” as deﬁned by Ong).
With regard to external debt, the Singapore Department of Statistics
(SDOS) distinguished between external debt per se—deﬁned as “all over-
seas loans drawn by our corporate, government and household sectors,
butexclud[ing] our banks’ overseas inter-bank loans” (SDOS 2000, p. 1; we
discuss bank borrowing below)—and “secondary forms of external debt,”
comprising negotiable debt securities (SDOS 1998, p. 2) such as bonds,
debentures, treasury bills, and trade credits (deﬁned by SDOS 1998 as
“direct extension of credit by suppliers and buyers for goods and services
transactions and advance payments for work that is in progress”). Tables
12.3–12.8 provide information on these forms of debt during the 1990s.
According to the SDOS (1998, p. 2), “Singapore has had no public external
debt since 1995,” owing to its regular budget surpluses. Its debt sustain-
ability ratios were much more favorable than those of other countries in the
region. About three-quarters of the external corporate debt was contracted
by foreign-owned companies.16
588 Basant K. Kapur
Table 12.2 Average leverage ratio during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s
1970s 1980s 1990s
Singapore
DAR 0.33 0.36 0.31
Short-term DAR 0.24 0.24 0.21
Long-term DAR 0.09 0.12 0.10
Short- to long-term debt ratio 2.55 1.97 1.98
Canada
DAR 0.24 0.28 0.30
Short-term DAR 0.11 0.17 0.15
Long-term DAR 0.13 0.11 0.15
Short- to long-term debt ratio 0.86 1.53 1.04
United States
DAR 0.30 0.33 0.37
Short-term DAR 0.11 0.15 0.17
Long-term DAR 0.19 0.18 0.21
Short- to long-term debt ratio 0.59 0.85 0.80
Source: Ong (1998).
Notes: DAR   debt-asset ratio. For Singapore, data refer to period 1990–97. For Canada,
data refer to period 1990–96. For the United States, data refer to period 1990–94.
16. The ﬁgure for nonbank loans at end 97, $4.518 billion, is the same in tables 12.3 and
12.6, but the ﬁgure for bank loans is larger in the former, since it includes loans to households
as well; nonbank lending to households is not signiﬁcant.Turning to secondary forms of external debt, the SDOS (2000) observes,
in regard to table 12.7, that “Singapore’s external liability in debt securities
nearly doubled from $2.0 billion at end-95 to $3.7 billion at end-98....  I t
was dominated by 4 foreign (3 Japanese and 1 U.S.) companies. The debt
securities are mostly short and medium term notes issued to provide ad-
ditional funds for the companies’ operation.” Regarding foreign direct
investment (FDI) nonequity liabilities, and excluding debt securities, a
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Table 12.3 Singapore’s external debt, end 1995 to end 1998 (in S$ millions)
End 1995 End 1996 End 1997 End 1998
Private sector 9,801 12,341 16,490 14,734
Loans
BIS banks 6,921 7,390 11,161 9,274
Non-BIS banks 434 1,053 811 808
Other nonresidents 2,446 3,898 4,518 4,652
Public sector 0 0 0 0
Total 9,801 12,341 16,490 14,734
Previous estimates 9,801 10,927 15,631
Source: SDOS (2000).
Notes: Data for 1998 are preliminary. BIS   Bank for International Settlements.
Table 12.4 Singapore debt sustainability ratios, end 1995 to end 1998 (%)
End 1995 End 1996 End 1997 End 1998
Debt to GNP 8.1 9.3 11.2 10.0
Debt to (domestic) exports 10.0 11.9 15.3 13.9
Source: SDOS (2000).
Note: Data for 1998 are preliminary.
Table 12.5 External debt sustainability ratios of selected countries (%)
End 1993 End 1994 End 1995 End 1996
External debt to GNP
Indonesia 58.9 57.4 56.9 59.9
Malaysia 38.7 36.9 42.6 42.1
The Philippines 64.1 59.3 51.5 47.3
Thailand 37.1 43.1 34.9 50.3
External debt to exports
Indonesia 211.9 195.8 202.9 222.2
Malaysia 43.5 37.7 40.8 42.4
The Philippines 187.0 160.6 121.8 97.6
Thailand 93.0 103.1 76.6 120.5
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, reproduced from SDOS (1998).Table 12.6 Overseas loans of local and foreign-owned companies, end 1997
Identiﬁed bank loans Nonbank loans Total
Value Share Value Share Value Share 
(US$ millions) (%) (US$ millions) (%) (US$ millions) (%)
Local-owned 1,258 21 1,445 32 2,703 26
Foreign-owned 4,754 79 3,073 68 7,827 74
Total 6,01 4,518 10,530
Source: SDOS (2000).
Note: “Identiﬁed bank loans” refers to bank loans that are identiﬁed in SDOS surveys.
Table 12.7 Secondary forms of external debt, end 1995 to end 1998 (in US$ millions)
End 1995 End 1996 End 1997 End 1998
Debt securities 1,952 2,419 3,585 3,662
FDI nonequity capital: Net liability 5,194 5,687 7,808 7,792
Loans 4,074 5,437 5,752
Trade credits: Liabilities 9,852 6,830 7,431 6,825
Trade credits: Assets 4,658 5,217 5,050 4,785
Non-FDI trade credits: Net asset 3,267 6,238 8,092 7,072
Assets 16,662 17,632 21,148 19,639
Liabilities 13,395 11,394 13,056 12,567
Source: SDOS (2000).
Note: Data for 1995 have been revised. Data for 1998 are preliminary.
Table 12.8 Net external position: Loans and debt securities, end 1996 to end 1997 
(in US$ millions)
End 1996 End 1997
Debt securities 6,303 7,454
Assets 8,722 11,039
Liabilities 2,419 3,585
Loans: Other nonresidents 4,804 6,846
Assets 8,702 11,364
Liabilities 3,898 4,518
Loans: FDI 3,518 3,944
Assets (outward FDI) 7,592 9,381
Liabilities (inward FDI) 4,074 5,437
Source: SDOS (2000).signiﬁcant portion comprised loans from parent companies. After 1995,
Singapore was a net creditor in all trade credit transactions (FDI and non-
FDI). As table 12.8 shows, it was also a net creditor in all the other cate-
gories covered in the preceding tables, namely debt securities, FDI-related
loans, and loans to other nonresidents, with the exception of borrowing
from external banks (table 12.3): the ﬁgure of almost S$12 billion here is
modest relative to other ﬁgures below, and it has not been netted against
lending by Singapore banks to external nonbank entities, on which data
are not provided.
The overall picture that emerges is that of a comfortable external debt
position, as far as nonbank entities are concerned. Turning to banks, as of
December 1997 the DBUs owed S$94.7 billion to banks outside Singapore
(including to the head oﬃces of foreign-owned banks); however, they had
also lent S$69.7 billion to banks outside Singapore (both ﬁgures are inclu-
sive of DBU transactions with ACUs, and all ﬁgures are from the Monthly
Digest of Statistics, Singapore, July 1998).17 The total asset base of DBUs
at that time (after deducting interbank lending between DBUs, but inclu-
sive of dealings with ACUs and other foreign banks) was S$163.7 billion,
and their total deposits from nonbank customers amounted to S$124.1 bil-
lion, with a further S$25.8 billion of deposits with the Post Oﬃce Savings
Bank. Also by way of comparison, Singapore’s stock market capitalization
was about S$180 billion in 1997 (Thiam 2002, table 1), notwithstanding the
depressed state of security prices at the time. Finally, with regard to bond
issuance speciﬁcally, total outstanding corporate bonds at that time, sold
to both domestic and foreign asset holders, amounted to S$8.4 billion
(S$6.7 billion being Singapore dollar issuance, and S$1.7 billion being
non–Singapore dollar issuance), and total outstanding governmental debt
(secondary debt according to the SDOS classiﬁcation) comprised S$15.0
billion worth of bonds and S$6.9 billion worth of treasury bills (all ﬁgures
from the MAS web site’s sections on Singapore’s bond markets).
Given Singapore’s modest overall external debt position, its large for-
eign exchange reserves (amounting to about six times the size of the mon-
etary base18), and its small exchange rate depreciation relative to that of
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17. We focus here on DBUs, since the oﬀshore market or the ACUs transact virtually en-
tirely in foreign currencies.
18. These very large reserves are to a not insigniﬁcant degree a reﬂection of Singapore’s
fairly low domestic absorption capacity (given its small size), juxtaposed against its large sav-
ings rate over many years. Nor does it appear that such large reserve holdings impose a sig-
niﬁcant opportunity cost on the economy: a Straits Times(Singapore) report of July 22, 2004,
by Audrey Tan quotes the assistant managing director of the MAS, Ong Chong Tee, as say-
ing, “we are invested across a diversiﬁed range of markets and currencies” and that owing to
“the better performance of global equity markets,” the MAS’s proﬁts in the year ending
March 31, 2004, jumped to S$4.99 billion (from just S$623 million the previous year). The
bulk of these proﬁts arose from investing its foreign reserves, which totaled US$96.3 billion
at the beginning of the year. The report adds that the MAS “does not disclose the rate of re-
turn on its investments” but that, according to Ong, “on average, MAS’ performance wouldother countries in the region, it is not surprising that its external indebted-
ness was not a noticeable aggravating factor in the 1997–98 downturn. It is,
however, of interest to examine the reasons for the historical underdevel-
opment of Singapore’s bond markets (as seen above, its banking system
and equities market are much more developed) and to review the measures
taken since 1998 to foster their growth, with particular reference to their
implications for the noninternationalization policy.19
We may divide the reasons for the historical underdevelopment into
supply and demand factors, while recognizing that there is some interaction
between the two. Perhaps the most important supply factor has been the
healthy ﬁscal position of the government, which has resulted in a limited
need for it to issue bonds. Moreover, the bonds that were issued were of low
maturity (not more than seven years, prior to 1998), and the bulk of them,
and of treasury bills, were held by banks and ﬁnance companies (to a signif-
icant extent to meet minimum liquidity requirements), as well as insurance
companies, resulting in a very limited secondary bond market. It should,
however, be noted that we exclude here “specially-issued, non-tradable,
long-term government bonds which are held by the CPF [Central Provident
Fund] until maturity” (Ngiam and Loh 2002, p. 6). The CPF is Singapore’s
compulsory saving scheme, and its holdings of these special bonds substan-
tially exceed the outstanding amount of other, tradable government securi-
ties. Ngiam and Loh add, “Most of the proceeds from such [CPF-purchased]
bonds are probably channeled to the Government of Singapore Investment
Corporation (GSIC) for investment in foreign assets” (p. 6).
An important consequence of the underdevelopment of the governmen-
tal bond market, particularly the secondary market, was the absence of a
benchmark yield curve to facilitate corporate issuance, and active trading,
of bonds. At the same time, it may be hypothesized that Singaporeans’ ap-
petite for a secure, long-term asset has to a large extent been met, albeit
compulsorily, by their CPF savings, notwithstanding the somewhat low re-
turn on such savings (Asher 2004). They may thus wish to channel most if
not all of their remaining discretionary savings (beyond that used to ﬁ-
nance home ownership) to more liquid bank deposits and to higher-
yielding but risky equity investments, an explanation that would help ac-
count for the more advanced state of development of Singapore’s banking
system and equities market—which in turn makes it easier for Singapore
corporations to raise funds from these sources.
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place it in the top 25th percentile of its peer group of fund managers.” Substantial sums are
also invested by the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (in ﬁnancial and real
assets abroad) and Temasek Holdings (until recently, mostly in government-linked-
companies domestically), but the precise amounts are not known, and neither is the former’s
rate of return on its investments.
19. Valuable references here are Ngiam and Loh (2002), Lee (2001), and U.S. Embassy
(2001).With a largely captive market for government securities, the government
could aﬀord to pay low yields on these. Moreover, until recently, “Singa-
pore investors [had] to pay tax on interest income whereas they [did] not
have to pay tax on capital gains obtained from investing in equities and
properties” (Ngiam and Loh 2002, p. 11). Lastly, much of Singapore’s eco-
nomic growth has historically been driven by large inﬂows of FDI, with
foreign-owned companies receiving major infusions of equity and loans
from their parent companies.
The Asian crisis of 1997–98 provided a major impetus to a shift in pol-
icy thinking regarding bond market development in Singapore. The crisis
highlighted the dangers of currency and maturity mismatches in corporate
borrowing, and Singapore banks also suﬀered losses due to exposure to the
region, although none was in danger of collapsing. It therefore appeared
prudent to diversify the sources of borrowing on the part of Singapore cor-
porations, particularly long-term borrowing, and encourage them to bor-
row in Singapore dollars. Also, with economic growth the pool of discre-
tionary saving was growing substantially, notwithstanding the high CPF
contribution rate, and fund management companies had become increas-
ingly active in the economy. One may surmise that concomitantly the de-
mand for market determination of bond yields, and of greater market li-
quidity, was also growing. This was underscored by the severe fall in equity
and property prices during the crisis. From a longer-term, developmental
perspective, fostering of a further pillar of Singapore’s dynamic ﬁnancial
sector was also deemed desirable. The intention was to encourage not only
Singaporean but also foreign corporations, and multilateral institutions, to
ﬂoat bond issues in Singapore.
Accordingly, since 1999 the MAS has issued, on a regular basis, more
Singapore government securities (SGSs), with larger issuances and longer
maturities (up to ﬁfteen years). The healthy ﬁscal position of the govern-
ment has enabled it to oﬀer lower yields on such securities and yet ensure
their acceptance by investors.20 Statutory boards and government-linked
corporations (GLCs) have also become active in bond issuance, relying
less on bank borrowing: for example, the Jurong Town Corporation
launched a S$200 million twelve-year issue in 2000, and Singapore
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20. See ﬁgures 12.2 and 12.3 (from Wong 2004) in respect of Singapore and U.S. govern-
ment ten-year bond yields in the recent past. The former yield has almost invariably been be-
low the latter, while tracking its movement fairly closely, except in recent months, which Wong
attributes to expectations of continued weakening of the U.S. dollar. The IMF Country Re-
port of October 2001 on Singapore (Kochhar et al. 2001) also points out that SGSs oﬀer lower
yields than U.S. Treasury bonds but have nonetheless been included in JPMorgan’s Govern-
ment Bond Index (GBI) Broad since April 2001 (with a weight of one-third percent) because
of their low cross-correlations with returns from most other government bonds and their very
low volatility of returns, “which help to expand the eﬃcient portfolio frontier for bonds” (p.
24). McCauley and Jiang (2004) provide a detailed analysis of the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts from
holding a range of Asian currency bonds in addition to those from other areas.Telecommunications launched a S$1 billion ﬁve-year issue in February
2001. The intention has been “to stimulate the emergence of a debt mar-
ket, and to establish benchmark rates” (U.S. Embassy 2001, p. 2). Sec-
ondary markets are still fairly small (Ngiam and Loh 2002), although
growing. Tax exemption for fee income earned by ﬁnancial institutions ar-
ranging debt securities in Singapore (in Singapore dollars as well as for-
eign currencies) was also granted, interest income earned by nonresidents
was exempted from withholding tax, and a concessionary tax rate of 10
percent was introduced on interest income earned by ﬁnancial institu-
tions and corporations from holding debt securities. Interest rate futures
594 Basant K. Kapur
Fig. 12.2 Singapore dollar and U.S. dollar bond yields
Source: Wong (2004).
Note: The left column measures the Singapore bond yield.
Fig. 12.3 U.S. dollar and Singapore dollar bond yields
Source: Wong (2004).
Note: The left column measures the U.S. bond yield.contracts were introduced, and restrictions on Singapore dollar over-the-
counter (OTC) interest rate derivatives such as interest rate swaps, for-
ward rate agreements, and interest rate and swap options were lifted
(Ngiam and Loh 2002, p. 13).21The authorities have also attempted to fos-
ter primary and secondary market liquidity through measures such as the
introduction of an SGS repurchase facility for primary dealers and a ﬁve-
year SGS bond futures contract.
Of particular interest for our purpose is “the opening up of the S$
bond market to foreign issuers . . . accomplished through MAS Notice
757, introduced in August 1998 and amended in November 1999”
(Ngiam and Loh 2002, p. 8).22 The proceeds from such issues could be
retained in the form of domestic currency deposits with banks in Singa-
pore pending use; however, if and when the proceeds were to be used
outside Singapore, they had to be converted or swapped into foreign cur-
rency before remitting abroad (Ngiam and Loh 2002). Funds raised for
use in Singapore by nonbank nonresidents for designated economic ac-
tivities—excluding, for example, “speculating in the S$ currency and in-
terest rate markets” (Lee 2001, p. 36)—did not require prior MAS ap-
proval. Prior approval was also not required for transacting in several
derivative products (fuller details are provided in the appendix). Lee
(2001) also points out that Notice 757 (of August 1998) “fully liberalized
the extension of S$ credit facilities to residents” (p. 35). Interestingly, in
the revised Notice 757 of May 28, 2004, the MAS has stated that, eﬀec-
tive from that date, nonresident nonﬁnancial issuers of Singapore dollar
bonds and equities were no longer required to swap or convert their pro-
ceeds into foreign currencies before remitting abroad, adding that this
revision “would allow the issuers greater ﬂexibility in managing their S$
funds.” For nonresident ﬁnancial institutions, however, the requirement
was retained.
A short time after the policy of August 1998 was announced, according
to the U.S. Embassy (2001),
the International Finance Corporation became the ﬁrst foreign entity to
issue S$ bonds, with a S$300 million three-year issue. GE Capital fol-
lowed in Q1 1999 as the ﬁrst foreign private issuer, with a S$300 million
issue, followed by the Nordic Investment Bank and the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. A wide range of foreign ﬁnancial
institutions and other corporates have launched issues since early 1999
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21. “However,” Ngiam and Loh add, “banks are required to submit monthly reports on de-
tails of interest rate derivative transactions exceeding S$5 million with counter-parties out-
side Singapore” (p. 13).
22. Foreign entities have also been permitted to list Singapore dollar–denominated shares
since late 1998, but similar restrictions to those discussed immediately below on the use of the
proceeds outside Singapore have applied (Shook Lin and Bok 2001).(including US issuers such as Ford Motor Credit, JPMorgan, UPS,
Morgan Stanley, John Hancock, General Motors Acceptance, and
Goldman Sachs, as well as a wide range of European entities and some
Asian entities).
By the ﬁrst quarter of 2002, total Singapore dollar bond issue by foreign
entities amounted to S$7.2 billion (Ngiam and Loh 2002, p. 8), and the
market continues to grow, thereby helping to meet the demand of both do-
mestic and foreign investors (including fund managers) for such instru-
ments.
Ngiam and Loh (2002, p. 20) further mention that “from December
2000 onward, non-residents have been allowed to borrow Singapore dol-
lars [from banks] to buy SGS and SDCB [Singapore dollar corporate
bonds],” as well as Singapore dollar equities and real estate (U.S. Em-
bassy 2001). Banks were also permitted to “extend S$ credit facilities ex-
ceeding S$5 million to nonresidents to fund oﬀshore activities, as long as
the S$ proceeds are swapped into foreign currency” (Lee 2001, p. 37), to
transact in Singapore dollars currency options with other banks and ﬁ-
nancial institutions in Singapore, and to transact with nonresidents in a
broad range of derivative products (Lee 2001, p. 37; the appendix pro-
vides further details). Foreign securities intermediaries were permitted to
freely obtain Singapore dollar ﬁnancing domestically, and, eﬀective
March 1, 2001, oﬀshore banks were permitted to freely engage in Singa-
pore dollar swap activity with nonbanks (U.S. Embassy 2001). In March
2002, Singapore dollar credit facilities to nonresident nonﬁnancial enti-
ties (such as corporate treasury centers) were liberalized, so that only
credit in excess of S$5 million to nonresident ﬁnancial entities for specu-
lating against the Singapore dollar was prohibited, and even these enti-
ties were permitted to engage in a wider range of derivative transactions
(such as Singapore dollar currency options) with ﬁnancial institutions.
The intention was to promote the deepening of such markets. We discuss
the overall implications of measures to promote ﬁnancial market devel-
opment in the conclusion.
12.6 Conclusion
Singapore clearly has strong defenses against what it deems excessive ex-
change rate volatility triggered by destabilizing capital ﬂows. These include
its strong fundamentals (discussed in the Chan and Ngiam quotation at
the beginning of section 12.4), the adoption of a CB system, and the non-
adherence to a ﬁxed currency peg when the economic situation changes.
(Indeed, an important lesson is that it is the package of policies in totality
that can meaningfully be evaluated, rather than individual policies in isola-
tion from the overall policy context.) Under the imperative of promoting
the continued growth and diversiﬁcation of its ﬁnancial sector—an impor-
596 Basant K. Kapurtant pillar of the economy, accounting for about 12 percent of its GDP—
quite a number of administrative restrictions have been relaxed since 1997.
This was heralded in a key address on November 4, 1997, by then Deputy
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong:
In order to meet the upcoming challenges, DPM Lee proposed a funda-
mental change in Singapore’s attitude towards risk management....  I n
contrast to Hong Kong, “where anything not expressly forbidden is per-
mitted,” Lee noted that in Singapore “anything not expressly permitted
is forbidden.” At this stage, however, the government needed to regulate
the ﬁnancial sector “with a lighter touch, accept more calculated risks,
and give the industry more room to innovate and stretch the envelope”
in order to promote a more competitive, dynamic and innovative envi-
ronment. Lee argued for a disclosure-based regulatory system to protect
investors, rather than . . . extensive regulations. (U.S. Embassy 1999)
The progressive relaxations of the Singapore dollar noninternational-
ization policy, which in any event was a rather limited form of capital con-
trol, may be viewed in this light.23 Such relaxations, including those on a
wide variety of derivative transactions, were necessary to foster bond mar-
ket development in Singapore, and the evidence provided in this chapter in-
dicates that this objective (including the attraction of foreign bond-issuers)
is well on the way to being achieved. Since May 2004, the only remaining
restriction of any signiﬁcance is the onus placed on banks to determine, as
far as possible, that the Singapore dollar credit facilities they extend to
nonresident ﬁnancial institutions will not be used for currency specula-
tion. This would appear to be a reasonable restriction, especially in light of
the very high interest rate volatility experienced by Hong Kong (which did
not impose such a restriction) during speculative periods (see the begin-
ning of section 12.2). Given the MAS’s reputation for toughness, one
would expect that banks will err on the side of caution in implementing this
policy. Financial market development is thereby facilitated, and at the
same time the risk of heightened currency speculation during turbulent
periods is reduced, along with the associated macroeconomic instability. It
is also quite conceivable that restrictions—for example, on swap transac-
tions—would be reintroduced if it was felt that the situation so warranted.
A similar policy orientation may be seen in the securities market. In
1998, Morgan Stanley launched the Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI) Singapore stock index futures contract, and in 2000 the Straits
Times Singapore stock index futures contract was launched, both on Sin-
gapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). However, SIMEX is
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23. A study by the MAS (2000a) found that during the 1990s, and prior to the Asian crisis,
covered and uncovered interest parity tended to hold between Singapore and U.S. one- and
three-month interbank rates respectively, indicating, as one might expect, a high degree of ﬁ-
nancial integration.authorized by the MAS to “establish position and trading limits to dimin-
ish or prevent excessive speculation” (Lawton 1999, section 3) and also
maintains a large trader reporting system. Somewhat ironically, in the light
of (now) Prime Minister Lee’s observations, while Singapore has moved 
to a more relaxed regulatory regime, Hong Kong has tightened up some-
what, and the two systems are closer than they previously were. This per-
haps is where the golden mean lies—a fairly, although not completely,
unrestrictive, rule-based system in general, but with provision for discre-
tionary intervention when the situation warrants. Do such discretionary
provisions create uncertainty for business, and can they be abused? If they
are intelligently employed, they can be very valuable in times of stress, and
perhaps the best safeguard against abuse is public analysis and discussion
whenever they are employed.
Appendix
Chronology of Capital Controls in Singapore
June 1, 1978
Exchange controls are completely liberalized, in line with eﬀorts to develop
Singapore as a banking and ﬁnancial center (including oﬀshore banking).
From then on, “residents are allowed to borrow, lend and invest freely in
foreign currencies. Banks in Singapore that are licensed to deal in Asian
Currency Units can freely accept deposits in foreign currencies. Residents
may deal freely in spot and forward foreign exchange transactions. Non-
residents are freely allowed to make direct and portfolio investments in the
country” (MAS 1999, p. 2).
November 1, 1983
MAS Notice 621, setting out the policy of noninternationalization of the
Singapore dollar, is issued (see section 12.3).
July 18, 1992
The MAS amends the policy by distinguishing three categories of activi-
ties:
1. The approved category: Consultation with the MAS is not required
for credit facilities extended in Singapore dollars, in any amount, to resi-
dents or nonresidents to facilitate direct exports from and imports to Sin-
gapore, and for payment bonds in favor of Singapore parties, or payment
guarantees (including guarantees for tax payments), in respect of “eco-
nomic activities” in Singapore, where the latter speciﬁcally excludes ﬁnan-
598 Basant K. Kapurcial and portfolio investments. Forward sales of Singapore dollars earned
from exports to Singapore are also permitted.
2. The banned category: Banks are not to ﬁnance in Singapore dollars
“activities which have no bearing on Singapore,” including direct or port-
folio investments outside Singapore by nonresidents, third-country trade
by nonresident-controlled companies, and nonresident subscription to eq-
uity in a Singapore company where the proceeds are used for takeovers or
ﬁnancial investments. Banks are also not to extend Singapore dollar credit
facilities, in any amount, to nonresidents for speculating in the local ﬁ-
nancial and property markets.
3. The unlisted category: The 1983 ruling calling for consultation with
the MAS continues to apply for all other activities, which are quite wide
ranging; these include third-country trade as well as direct and portfolio
investments overseas by residents, and direct investment and housing de-
velopment in Singapore by nonresidents.
August 1998
In conjunction with an “extensive program of ﬁnancial sector liberalization”
(Lee 2001, p. 35), the MAS issues the ﬁrst version of Notice 757, which re-
places Notice 621; this and subsequent versions seek to successively relax
restrictions against various ﬁnancial transactions. While concluding that
“the basic policy remains sound,” the MAS states that “some judicious relaxa-
tion of speciﬁc restrictions would foster the development of capital markets
with minimal incremental risks” (quoted in Lee 2001, p. 35).
The notice fully liberalizes the extension of Singapore dollar credit fa-
cilities to residents. In addition, banks can now engage in the following ac-
tivities without prior consultation with the MAS (Lee 2001):
1. Extension of Singapore dollar credit facilities to, and arranging Sin-
gapore dollar equity listings or bond issues for, nonbank nonresidents if
the Singapore dollar proceeds are used for designated economic activities
in Singapore.
2. Extension of Singapore dollar credit facilities to nonbank nonresi-
dents for ﬁnancial investments—shares, bonds, deposits, and commercial
properties in Singapore—up to S$5 million.
3. Extension of Singapore dollar credit facilities up to S$20 million to
nonresidents, via repurchase agreements of SGSs.
4. A limited list of derivative transactions, including hedging of cur-
rency or interest rates from the activities listed in item 1 above, and trans-
acting in Singapore dollar interest rate futures with nonresidents.
For other activities, consultation with the MAS continues to be required,
and in addition the Singapore dollar proceeds from credit facilities and
bond and equity listings arranged for nonbank nonresidents have to be
converted or swapped into foreign currency if they are to be used outside
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residents for certain purposes—including speculating in the Singapore
dollar currency and interest rate markets, ﬁnancing third-country trades,
and ﬁnancing acquisition of shares of companies not listed on the stock ex-
change or Central Limit Order Book—is explicitly prohibited.
November 1999
Banks are permitted to engage in an expanded range of activities without
prior consultation with the MAS, including extension of Singapore dollar
credit facilities to, and transacting in Singapore dollar interest rate prod-
ucts with, other banks, merchant banks, ﬁnance companies, and insurance
companies in Singapore; extension of Singapore dollar credit facilities of
any amount to nonresidents via repurchases of SGSs or other Singapore
dollar bonds; arranging Singapore dollar equity listings for nonresident
companies as long as the Singapore dollar proceeds are converted into for-
eign currency before being used outside Singapore; and all Singapore dol-
lar derivative transactions with residents, as well as an expanded range of
derivative transactions with nonresidents, including option-related prod-
ucts with nonﬁnancial counterparts. However, banks are still required to
consult with the MAS before transacting in Singapore dollars currency op-
tions or option-related products with nonbank ﬁnancial institutions, and
before extending Singapore dollar credit facilities exceeding S$5 million to
banks and other ﬁnancial institutions outside Singapore, and they are not
permitted to transact in Singapore dollars currency options or option-
related products with other banks.
December 2000
Nonresidents are permitted to borrow Singapore dollars (from banks) to
buy SGSs and SDCBs, as well as Singapore dollar equities and real estate.
Banks are also permitted to extend Singapore dollar credit facilities ex-
ceeding S$5 million to nonresidents to fund oﬀshore activities, as long as
the proceeds are swapped into foreign currency; to transact in Singapore
dollars currency options with other banks and ﬁnancial institutions in Sin-
gapore; and to transact with nonresidents in a broad range of derivative
products, including cross-currency swaps and currency options for hedg-
ing purposes, Singapore dollar interest rate derivatives, and equity deriva-
tives. Foreign securities intermediaries are permitted to freely obtain
Singapore dollar ﬁnancing domestically, and, eﬀective March 1, 2001, oﬀ-
shore banks are permitted to engage freely in Singapore dollar swap activ-
ity with nonbanks.
March 2002
Singapore dollar credit facilities to nonresident nonﬁnancial entities (such
as corporate treasury centers) are liberalized, so that only credit in excess
600 Basant K. Kapurof S$5 million to nonresident ﬁnancial entities—including banks, ﬁnance
companies, insurance companies, hedge funds, and securities dealers and
brokers—for speculating against the Singapore dollar is prohibited. Even
the latter entities are permitted to engage in a wider range of derivative
transactions (such as Singapore dollar currency options) with ﬁnancial in-
stitutions, except that foreign exchange swaps involving a spot sale of Sin-
gapore dollars to the nonresident in the ﬁrst leg remain under the rubric of
Singapore dollar credit facilities. Apart from this, transactions involving
asset swaps, cross-currency swaps, and cross-currency repurchases are fully
liberalized. The intention is to promote the deepening of such markets
and make it easier for Singapore dollar equities and debts to be swapped
into foreign currencies for overseas use. Financial institutions are also no
longer required to ensure that Singapore dollar credit facilities extended
to ﬁnance investments be withdrawn when the investments are liquidated,
thereby lessening the burden of tracking fund use.
May 28, 2004
Nonresident nonﬁnancial issuers of Singapore dollar bonds and equities
are no longer required to swap or convert their Singapore dollar proceeds
into foreign currencies before remitting abroad, so as to “allow the issuers
greater ﬂexibility in managing their S$ funds” (MAS Notice 757). For non-
resident ﬁnancial institutions, however, the requirement is retained for Sin-
gapore dollar proceeds from equity and bond listings and from borrowing
from banks. Banks are also required to report to the MAS monthly their
aggregate outstanding Singapore dollar lending to nonresident ﬁnancial
institutions. It is reiterated in Notice 757 that “banks shall not extend S$
credit facilities [exceeding S$5 million] to non-resident ﬁnancial institu-
tions if there is reason to believe that the S$ proceeds may be used for S$
currency speculation.”
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Singapore’s macroeconomic history sets it apart from the other coun-
tries discussed in this volume. A number of developing countries have
lurched from crisis to crisis, plagued by a variety of economic ills such as
unsustainable ﬁscal positions, current account deﬁcits, lax monetary poli-
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ness, University of Michigan.cies, rampant inﬂation, high unemployment rates, and weak corporate
governance mechanisms. In contrast, Singapore’s economic good fortune
is one of budget and current account surpluses, a high savings rate, low in-
ﬂation, good institutions, a sound ﬁnancial system, and—last but not
least—a stable currency.
Closer examination reveals that a cornerstone of Singapore’s policy on
capital account openness is the noninternationalization of the Singapore
dollar. Banks are required to follow a policy of noninternationalization in
large part because the government is concerned about the buildup of
oﬀshore deposits of the Singapore dollar that could be used by speculators
to destabilize the currency. The policy is applied to a broad range of ﬁnan-
cial instruments including bond issues and derivative products.
The policy is in part also designed to help Singapore maintain the “soft
peg” that has been crucial for its export-led strategy of development. Sin-
gapore’s successful maintenance of its soft peg deﬁes the conventional wis-
dom that soft pegs are not viable (Eichengreen 1999).
It is worth noting that, following revisions in March 2002, only two core
requirements of the policy on capital controls remain. First, ﬁnancial in-
stitutions are not allowed to extend Singapore dollar credit facilities in ex-
cess of S$5 million to nonresident ﬁnancial entities, if they have reason to
believe that the proceeds may be used for speculation against the Singapore
dollar. Second, for a Singapore dollar loan to a nonresident ﬁnancial en-
tity exceeding S$5 million, or for a Singapore dollar equity or bond issue
by a nonresident entity that is used to fund overseas activities, the Singa-
pore dollar proceeds must be swapped or converted into foreign currency
before use outside Singapore. According to the Monetary Authority of
Singapore (2002), the policy continues to be necessary to prevent oﬀshore
speculators from accessing the liquidity in Singapore’s onshore foreign ex-
change swaps and money markets.
In these comments I will argue that the policy of noninternationalization
has perhaps outlived its use and may in fact be a factor that hinders the de-
velopment of an active bond market in Singapore.
Destabilizing Speculation versus Deteriorating Fundamentals
Basant Kapur argues that Singapore has adopted a policy of noninter-
nationalization to ward oﬀ ﬁnancial instability of the sort experienced by
Hong Kong in 1998. Hong Kong and Singapore are often thought of as
being very similar. Indeed, both are city-states with a British colonial her-
itage, and both have been in the set of “Asian tigers” that achieved ex-
tremely rapid economic growth from the 1960s until very recently. Kapur
contends that the “double play” by foreign speculators—simultaneously
shorting the Hong Kong stock index futures and selling the Hong Kong
dollar forward—was the root cause of the crisis in 1998.
There has been a long-standing academic and policy debate about the
604 Basant K. Kapurfactors that drive currency crises. In this context, the role of large players
has been particularly important. On the one hand, large traders and arbi-
trageurs may improve the eﬃciency of the price mechanism because they
are well suited to collecting and processing information. Alternatively, fol-
lowing crisis episodes, the machinations of large players have been blamed
as catalysts of market panic and short-termism (Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini 2002). The literature provides many an example in which market
eﬃciency is jeopardized by the behavior of large traders as destabilizing
speculators (Krugman 2000).
According to Kapur, Hong Kong in 1998 provides an important ex-
ample of an economy that came close to the collapse of its currency board
regime as a result of aggressive speculation against its foreign exchange
and stock markets. In this example, only direct intervention by the author-
ities in the stock market prevented the collapse of the currency peg and a
further meltdown of its stock market. However, the eﬀects of defending the
peg, which probably exacerbated the recessionary eﬀects of the Asian cri-
sis on the domestic economy, were quite costly (Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini 2002).
In fact, it is rather hard to prove that speculation by large traders alone
caused a currency or stock market crisis episode. Crisis episodes generally
take place against a backdrop of deteriorating macro fundamentals, policy
uncertainties, and structural weaknesses (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini
2002). In other words, was the double play in Hong Kong a rational re-
sponse to deteriorating fundamentals?
Kapur concedes that the empirical ﬁndings do not provide evidence of
market manipulation per se. Indeed, Hong Kong experienced a sharp re-
cession in 1998, and GDP growth in the ﬁrst quarter was negative. Coupled
with worsening macroeconomic conditions in East Asia, a falling yen, and
the threat of Chinese devaluation, this may have led to a loss of conﬁdence
in the Hong Kong stock market and the survival of the currency peg.
Shorting both the Hong Kong stock market and its currency at that time
could therefore be interpreted as a rational strategy for all investors, do-
mestic and foreign, highly leveraged or not (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini
2002). In other words, the hypothesis of rational investors taking short po-
sitions in two markets (based on an assessment of economic fundamentals)
and the hypothesis of a double play (suggesting market manipulation) are
observationally equivalent. Kapur acknowledges this point. The rationale
for the continued maintenance of the policy of noninternationalization in
Singapore is therefore not apparent.
Developing a Viable Bond Market
The second issue that Kapur focuses on is the concerted eﬀort being
made by Singapore to develop its bond market. It is interesting to note the
unique factors separate from the policy of noninternationalization that
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tries, the need to develop active bond markets stems from a public ﬁnance
motive—namely, to ﬁnance government deﬁcits. In contrast, Singapore
has consistently run budget surpluses since the 1980s. Therefore, the gov-
ernment’s borrowing needs have not spawned a domestic bond market.
Many large companies in Singapore also do not require bond ﬁnancing, as
they tend to be cash rich.
Moreover, Singapore has a sophisticated bank lending network and eq-
uity capital market, which provide viable ﬁnancing alternatives in the ab-
sence of bond markets. Hence, the need to develop the debt markets in Sin-
gapore must be governed by other imperatives.
One imperative may be the desire on the part of the government to de-
velop the island state as a ﬁnancial services hub for the region. In the longer
term, Singapore may aspire to become a center for the issuing and trading
of regional currency bonds. Like Switzerland, Singapore has all the neces-
sary ingredients of an active corporate bond market—low borrowing
costs, political stability, sound fundamentals, a stable currency, and a AAA
sovereign rating.
Despite these attractive features, Singapore has been characterized by a
historic underdevelopment of its bond market or suﬀers from original sin
on the supply side. It is important to note that the greater part of interna-
tional bond issuance takes place in relatively few currencies. For example,
international bonds and notes denominated in the U.S. dollar, the euro,
and the British pound account for approximately 88 percent of the total
amounts outstanding for these instruments (BIS Quarterly Review 2005).
This may prove to be an obstacle for a small country like Singapore as it
tries to develop as a regional hub for international bond issuance in its own
currency.
Interestingly, despite the fact that the government has run budget sur-
pluses since the 1980s and maintains huge reserves, the government has ac-
tively promoted the development of a government bond market. In fact,
the government securities market remains the biggest segment of the debt
markets in Singapore. In part, developing the government bond market
may fulﬁll the important purpose of providing a benchmark yield curve as
a reference for the term structure of corporate issues.
The second measure that Singapore has undertaken to develop its bond
market has been the opening up of the Singapore dollar bond market to
foreign issuers. Foreign issuers may be attracted to the Singapore market
because of low borrowing costs and a large pool of Singapore dollar funds.
However, the policy of noninternationalization continues to apply to Sin-
gapore dollar bond issuance by foreigners. If Singapore dollar proceeds
from the bond issuance are not used for economic activity in Singapore,
they must be swapped into a foreign currency before being remitted
abroad.
606 Basant K. KapurNote that a Singapore dollar loan combined with a currency swap results
in a “synthetic” foreign currency loan. Also note that the swap market in-
volving the Singapore dollar is illiquid and has wide bid-ask spreads. It is
therefore not evident why foreign issuers would prefer to issue Singapore
dollar bonds and incur the heavy costs of swapping rather than directly is-
suing foreign currency bonds in the Eurodollar bond market. By imposing
swapping costs on foreign issuers, Singapore may in fact deter potential
foreign issuers from the Singapore dollar bond market.
However, there is another point worth noting in the context of the cur-
rency denomination of international bond issuance: This context further
highlights the idea that the policy of noninternationalization may have
outlived its purpose. Corporate risk management strategies require com-
panies to swap foreign currency–denominated loans (here, the Singapore
dollar) into their domestic currency (say, the U.S. dollar) so as to avoid a
currency mismatch between domestic assets and liabilities. The rationale
for the government maintaining the noninternationalization “require-
ment” is therefore unclear.
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